Abstract：Theories of fiscal decentralization and officials’ promotion incentives illuminate the behavioral motivations of local government’s implementation of land illegal acts. The theory of collusion among interest groups points out that minimizing illegal cost and realizing economic development of administrative area are dominant logic of local government “collusion” on implementing land illegal acts. However， all the above do not mean maximization of fiscal benefit or defect of land system are necessary and sufficient conditions for local government to involve， organize， and implement land illegal acts. It cannot explain the realities of whether local government has capacities to implement land illegal acts either. In fact， land illegal acts are products of government organizational structure and system environment. It is also the result of coexistence of excessive strengthening of incentive mechanism and defect of organizational accountability in government system design.
廖宏斌. 土地违法：一个政府行为的组织制度分析[J]. 华中师范大学学报（人文社会科学版）, 2017, 56(4): 11-17.
Liao Hongbin. Land Illegal Acts： An Organizational System Analysis of Government Behavior. journal1, 2017, 56(4): 11-17.
2017, Vol. 56 
