Abstract：Local governments had taken various measures to ease the condition of the 2007 Taihu Lake cyanobacteria crisis at that point. Also they had taken administrative measures and institutional measures like setting up the “river chief system” to clean up and protect Taihu Lake. The incident did not impact regional development， and there is no a crisis of similar scale ever taken place again， therefore these measures seems to be as effective as it was designed to be， and system of this sort has also been promoted. How could a local government overcome the environmental cost in the developmental process and show its adaptiveness and administrative capability？ Through actual participation， close observation， keep tracking of the developments of the incident， and to compare it with related cases，we can devise a more generalized form of institution. Developments spawn new problems， and pollution is one of the more urgent ones. But through contingent reply to the popular stress situation， the execution of coercive power and the dissolution of uncertainty， the local government forms a self-adapting mechanism and deals crisis at the base level by logics of “rent protection”.
陶逸骏 赵永茂. 环境事件中的体制护租：太湖蓝藻治理实践与河长制的背景[J]. 华中师范大学学报（人文社会科学版）, 2018, 57(2): 9-18.
Tao Yichun Chao Yungmau. Rent Protection of Regime in Environment Event：Governance of Cyanobacteria Problem in Taihu Lake and the Context of River Chief System. journal1, 2018, 57(2): 9-18.
2018, Vol. 57 
