Abstract:To analyze the influence of unfair aversion on the coordination of agricultural product supply chain under asymmetric cost information, a two-echelon supermarket-led supply chain is considered. In the case of supermarket sales cost information asymmetry and cooperatives with unfair aversion, agricultural product supply chain coordination problem with wholesale price contract is studied. The research shows that in the case of cooperatives with disadvantageous unfair aversion cooperatives, the optimal agricultural output of cooperatives is not higher than that of traditional cooperatives, and it is a decreasing function of cooperative disadvantageous unfair aversion coefficient, when the wholesale price contracts will not coordinate the two-echelon agricultural product supply chain; in the case of cooperatives with advantageous unfair aversion, the cooperative's optimal agricultural output is not lower than the traditional cooperative's optimal agricultural output, and it is an increasing function of the cooperative's favorable unfair aversion coefficient, when the wholesale price contracts will coordinate the two-echelon agricultural product supply chain under certain conditions.