Abstract：There is market failure in public rental housing， the matching of supply and demand is considered to be difficult to obtain the optimal solution， the problems of the process of public rental housing matching are often neglected， but the theory and practice of market design bring light to the solution of these problems. Following the theory and experiment of public rental housing matching， starting with preference in cooperation games and the core with the indivisibility， this paper does systematically works in interpreting the design of the public rental housing matching market from initial allocation to reallocation exchange and redistribution adjustment. Theoretical research proves the superperformance of RSD， TTC and G-S mechanisms， as well as those derivative mechanisms， while experimental tests show that these several mechanisms are not consistent with theories above. Three crucial reasons could explain why there is still a certain gap with the theoretical stability logic： the failure to follow through Strategy-Proof in all mechanisms， the limitations of environmental complexity and cognitive deviation， or the mechanisms which are not OSP.
邓红平 万秦娟. 公租房配租市场设计稳定性探究[J]. 华中师范大学学报（人文社会科学版）, 2020, 59(3): 52-64.
Deng Hongping Wan Qinjuan. Study on Stability of Market Design in Public Rental Housing Matching Market. journal1, 2020, 59(3): 52-64.
2020, Vol. 59 
