Abstract：The main focus of deepening rural reform in the new situation is still to handle the relationship between farmers and land. The reform of the farmland property rights system is a crucial breakthrough in solving the “three rural issues” (agriculture， countryside， and farmers). Compared with the institutional reform of private property rights in the West， China’s farmland property rights system has always been incomplete. How to explain the endurance of this incomplete farmland property rights has become the research basis. Through the analysis of the phasic characteristics of incomplete farmland property rights in China， it is found that the national governance objectives and the capacity of grassroots governance constitute the generative logic of incomplete farmland property rights. That is， the national objectives of resource extraction and order stabilization affect the benefits of maintaining incomplete property rights， while the autonomy and implementation capacity of grassroots governments affect the costs of promoting complete property rights. The formal institutional reform of the state and the informal institutional adjustment of society together constitute the survival logic of incomplete farmland property rights. It is manifested in the state’s top-down mandatory reform and bottom-up induced reform to reduce the “public domain” of property rights， and also in the farmers’ use of the protection of village organizations and support of social norms to reduce “rent dissipation”. Since the interaction between national governance and grassroots governance， and the interaction between formal institutions and informal institutions mainly occur in the grassroots field， incomplete farmland property rights also profoundly affect the operation of grassroots governance power， and promote the continuous transformations in the relationship between grassroots administration and rural autonomy. In order to deepen the reform of rural property rights system， it is necessary to further subdivide the property rights functions under the premise of collective ownership， and also to improve the collective action ability based on village and community autonomy， so as to realize the organic connection between property rights functions and governance effectiveness.
王敬尧 郑 鹏. 中国农地不完全产权的生成与存续[J]. 华中师范大学学报（人文社会科学版）, 2024, 63(6): 27-37.
Wang Jingyao Zheng Peng. The Creation and Continuation of Incomplete Property Rights of Farmland in China. journal1, 2024, 63(6): 27-37.
2024, Vol. 63 
