2025年04月06日 星期日 主页   |   首页   |   期刊介绍   |   编 委 会   |   投稿指南   |   期刊订阅   |   编辑队伍   |   留言板   |   联系我们   |   English
华中师范大学学报(自然科学版)  2018, Vol. 52 Issue (3): 373-382    
  本期目录 | 过刊浏览 | 高级检索 |
考虑零售商竞争和低碳宣传补贴的供应链合作减排
俞 超1,2, , 汪传旭2, 王志华1
1.江苏理工学院商学院, 江苏 常州 213001; 2.上海海事大学经济管理学院, 上海 201306
Supply chain cooperative emission reduction considered retailer competition and subsidies to low carbon propaganda
YU Chao1,2, WANG Chuanxu2, WANG Zhihua1
1.School of Business, Jiangsu University of Technology, Changzhou, Jiangsu 213001, China;2.School of Economics and Management, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai 201306, China
全文: PDF (5889 KB)   HTML (1 KB) 
输出: BibTeX | EndNote (RIS)      
摘要 考虑一个制造商主导和两个零售商追随的两级供应链,研究零售商竞争情况下的合作减排及低碳宣传决策.运用Stackelberg博弈理论分别构建了无补贴(NS)、单一补贴(SS)和双重补贴(DS)模式的分散决策博弈模型,得到了减排水平、低碳宣传投入以及低碳宣传成本分摊比例的均衡解.通过比较分析发现:DS模式下制造商利润、零售商利润、减排水平和产品总需求量均高于NS、SS模式;DS、SS模式下低碳宣传投入相同,但高于NS模式;DS、SS模式下低碳宣传成本分摊比例与SS模式相同,与零售商的边际收益、竞争强度系数负相关,与制造商边际收益正相关.最后运用算例验证了模型的有效性.
服务
把本文推荐给朋友
加入我的书架
加入引用管理器
E-mail Alert
RSS
作者相关文章
俞 超
汪传旭
王志华
关键词 合作减排 零售商竞争 低碳宣传 双重补贴 Stackelberg博弈    
Abstract:A supply chain consisting of a leading manufacturer and two following retailers is considered to research on cooperative emission reduction and low carbon propaganda decision under the condition of retailer competition. The Stackelberg game theory is used to construct a decentralized decision-making game model for no subsidies (NS), single subsidies (SS) and double subsidies (DS). The equilibrium solution of emission levels, low carbon propaganda investment and the proportion of low carbon propaganda cost sharing are obtained. Through the comparative analysis, it is shown that DS model of manufacturer's profit, retailer's profit, level of emission reduction and total product demand are higher than that of NS, SS model; under the model of DS and SS, the low carbon propaganda investment is the same, while higher than the NS model; the proportion of low carbon propaganda cost sharing in DS and SS mode is the same as that of SS mode, negatively related to the marginal revenue and the coefficient of competition intensity of retailers, and positively related to the marginal profit of manufacturer. Finally, a numerical example is given to demonstrate the validity of the models.
Key wordscooperative emission reduction    retailer competition    low carbon propaganda    double subsidies    Stackelberg game
收稿日期: 2018-06-11     
引用本文:   
俞 超,汪传旭,王志华. 考虑零售商竞争和低碳宣传补贴的供应链合作减排[J]. 华中师范大学学报(自然科学版), 2018, 52(3): 373-382.
YU Chao,WANG Chuanxu,WANG Zhihua. Supply chain cooperative emission reduction considered retailer competition and subsidies to low carbon propaganda. journal1, 2018, 52(3): 373-382.
链接本文:  
https://journal.ccnu.edu.cn/zk/CN/     或     https://journal.ccnu.edu.cn/zk/CN/Y2018/V52/I3/373
版权所有 © 《华中师范大学学报(自然科学版)》编辑部
地址:武汉市珞瑜路152号华中师范大学田家炳楼7楼华师学报编辑部 邮编:430079 电话(传真):027-67868127
本系统由北京玛格泰克科技发展有限公司设计开发 技术支持:support@magtech.com.cn