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华中师范大学学报(自然科学版)  2021, Vol. 55 Issue (2): 317-328    
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“互联网+”环境下社会组织三方协同监管的演化博弈研究
曹细玉, 吴卫群
电子科技大学中山学院经贸学院, 广东 中山 528402
Research on the evolution game of tripartite cooperative supervision in social organizations under the context of“Internet plus”
CAO Xiyu,WU Weiqun
School of Economics and Commerce,University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Zhongshan Institute,Zhongshan,Guangdong 528402,China
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摘要 “互联网+”环境促进了社会组织的快速发展,但也对社会组织的监管提出了更大的挑战.在社会组织三方协同监管中,通过引入社会公众参与率、网络舆情影响度、声誉收益、处罚等变量,构建了社会组织、第三方评估机构和政府部门的三方演化博弈模型,分析了影响各博弈方策略选择与演化的因素,给出了三方演化博弈策略趋于稳定的条件,最后利用Matlab对演化博弈中的理想稳定状态进行了仿真.研究结果表明:在网络舆情影响度、声誉收益、政府部门的处罚等因素的影响下,当社会公众参与监管的水平较高时,即使政府部门放松监管,社会组织也会倾向于选择合规行为策略,第三方评估机构倾向于选择真实评估策略;当社会公众参与监管的水平较低时,任何一方的策略演化趋势都与另外两方的策略选择有关.为此,提出通过提升社会组织信息化水平,建立和完善声誉机制、奖惩机制和参与机制,形成社会组织多元协同监管体系,将有助于社会组织的健康有序发展.
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曹细玉
吴卫群
关键词 “互联网+” 社会组织 协同监管 演化博弈    
Abstract:Despite the fast expansion of social organizations under the context of “Internet plus”,it poses more challenges to the supervision of social organizations. The tripartite evolution game model composed of social organizations, the third-party assessment institutions and government departments is constructed by introducing multiple variables such as public participation rate, influence degree of network public opinion, reputation income and penalty in the tripartite coordinated supervision of social organizations. The factors affecting the choice and evolution of each player's strategy are analyzed,andthe conditions to stabilize the tripartite strategy are provided. Finally, the ideal stable state in evolutionary game is simulated by means of Matlab. The results indicate that under the influence degree of network public opinion, reputation income and government authority penalty, when social public participation degree in supervision has a high level, social organizations prefers to choose compliance behavioral strategy, and the third-party assessment institutions prefers to choose real assessment strategies even though government departments deregulate. When social public participation degree in supervision has a low level, any strategic evolution trend is associated with the strategic choice of other two parties. Accordingly, the improvement of social organization's information level, the construction of reputationmechanism,rewardandpunishment mechanismandparticipation mechanisms, and the formation of a diverse and coordinated supervision system will facilitate the orderly and healthy development of social organizations.
Key wordsInternet plus    social organization    collaborative supervision    evolutionary game
收稿日期: 2021-04-01     
引用本文:   
曹细玉,吴卫群. “互联网+”环境下社会组织三方协同监管的演化博弈研究[J]. 华中师范大学学报(自然科学版), 2021, 55(2): 317-328.
CAO Xiyu,WU Weiqun. Research on the evolution game of tripartite cooperative supervision in social organizations under the context of“Internet plus”. journal1, 2021, 55(2): 317-328.
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