Abstract：Effective supervision is an important way to solve food safety problems in e-commerce. Focused on the condition of new-media participation， food safety supervision strategies are considered. Evolutionary game models of supervising food suppliers are constructed under four different reward-and-punishment mechanisms. These models focus on analyzing the impact of four different reward-and-punishment mechanisms and the authenticity and influence of new-media on the evolution and stability strategies. The numerical simulation analysis shows that the evolutionary game between the supplier and the platform under the dynamic reward-and-punishment mechanism converges to a stable state in a spiral， and the convergence effect is better. A dynamic reward-and-punishment mechanism is a better choice for supervising suppliers to achieve the market equilibriums with the new-media participation.
李佩芸,郭思培,张 鑫. 新媒体参与下食品电子商务平台动态奖惩机制分析[J]. 华中师范大学学报(自然科学版), 2023, 57(6): 765-776.
LI Peiyun,GUO Sipei,ZHANG Xin. Title analysis of dynamic reward-and-punishment mechanism of food e-commerce platform with the new-media participation. journal1, 2023, 57(6): 765-776.
2023, Vol. 57 
