Supply chain cooperative emission reduction considered retailer competition and subsidies to low carbon propaganda
YU Chao1,2， WANG Chuanxu2， WANG Zhihua1
1.School of Business， Jiangsu University of Technology， Changzhou， Jiangsu 213001， China；2.School of Economics and Management， Shanghai Maritime University， Shanghai 201306， China
Abstract：A supply chain consisting of a leading manufacturer and two following retailers is considered to research on cooperative emission reduction and low carbon propaganda decision under the condition of retailer competition. The Stackelberg game theory is used to construct a decentralized decision-making game model for no subsidies (NS)， single subsidies (SS) and double subsidies (DS). The equilibrium solution of emission levels， low carbon propaganda investment and the proportion of low carbon propaganda cost sharing are obtained. Through the comparative analysis， it is shown that DS model of manufacturer's profit， retailer's profit， level of emission reduction and total product demand are higher than that of NS， SS model； under the model of DS and SS， the low carbon propaganda investment is the same， while higher than the NS model； the proportion of low carbon propaganda cost sharing in DS and SS mode is the same as that of SS mode， negatively related to the marginal revenue and the coefficient of competition intensity of retailers， and positively related to the marginal profit of manufacturer. Finally， a numerical example is given to demonstrate the validity of the models.
2018, Vol. 52 
