Abstract：Despite the fast expansion of social organizations under the context of “Internet plus”，it poses more challenges to the supervision of social organizations. The tripartite evolution game model composed of social organizations， the third-party assessment institutions and government departments is constructed by introducing multiple variables such as public participation rate， influence degree of network public opinion， reputation income and penalty in the tripartite coordinated supervision of social organizations. The factors affecting the choice and evolution of each player's strategy are analyzed，andthe conditions to stabilize the tripartite strategy are provided. Finally， the ideal stable state in evolutionary game is simulated by means of Matlab. The results indicate that under the influence degree of network public opinion， reputation income and government authority penalty， when social public participation degree in supervision has a high level， social organizations prefers to choose compliance behavioral strategy， and the third-party assessment institutions prefers to choose real assessment strategies even though government departments deregulate. When social public participation degree in supervision has a low level， any strategic evolution trend is associated with the strategic choice of other two parties. Accordingly， the improvement of social organization's information level， the construction of reputationmechanism，rewardandpunishment mechanismandparticipation mechanisms， and the formation of a diverse and coordinated supervision system will facilitate the orderly and healthy development of social organizations.
曹细玉,吴卫群. “互联网＋”环境下社会组织三方协同监管的演化博弈研究[J]. 华中师范大学学报(自然科学版), 2021, 55(2): 317-328.
CAO Xiyu,WU Weiqun. Research on the evolution game of tripartite cooperative supervision in social organizations under the context of“Internet plus”. journal1, 2021, 55(2): 317-328.
2021, Vol. 55 
