Abstract：Green credit guides enterprises to change their crude business model by establishing environmental access thresholds， and the government curbs banks' and enterprises' irregularities of cheating on loans and subsidies through the incentive mechanism of granting subsidies and imposing fines. Exploring the incentive mechanism and strategic behaviors of the responsible parties for green development is conducive to better promoting green technological innovation of enterprises. To this end， a three-party evolutionary game model of enterprise， bank and government under the dynamic incentive mechanism is constructed. Enterprises and banks' cheating loan and subsidy behaviors are included in the model， and the impact of reward and punishment mechanisms on the strategic choices of the three parties is analyzed through numerical simulation. The results showed that the dynamic mechanism is more incentive for traditional enterprises and banks to choose green strategies， and the appropriate increase in subsidies and penalties are able to accelerate green development.
张申琪,郭思培. 基于绿色发展的动态激励机制设计研究[J]. 华中师范大学学报(自然科学版), 2025, 59(1): 83-95.
ZHANG Shenqi,GUO Sipei. Research on the design of dynamic incentive mechanism for green development. journal1, 2025, 59(1): 83-95.
2025, Vol. 59 
